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Pay Disparities Within Top Management Groups: Evidence of Harmful Effects on Performance of High-Technology Firms

Business School, Rutgers University, 240 Janice Levin Building, 94 Rockafeller Road, Piscataway, New Jersey 08854
Smeal College of Business Administration, Pennsylvania State University, 440 Beam Business Administration Building, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802
psiegel{at}rci.rutgers.edu
dch14{at}psu.edu

This study examines the interactive effect of technological intensiveness and top management group (TMG) pay disparity on firm performance. Drawing on two literatures—task interdependence and group rewards—we argue that: (a) technological intensiveness imposes a considerable requirement for multiway information processing and collaboration among senior executives of a firm, and (b) collaboration is diminished when large pay disparities exist. Hence, TMG pay disparity should be more detrimental to subsequent performance of high-technology firms than low-technology firms. We construct seven different measures of executive pay disparity based on three major types of pay disparity (vertical, horizontal, and overall) and use a proprietary data set to test our hypotheses. The results provide consistent support for our hypotheses, thereby suggesting important implications for scholars and designers of executive compensation.

Key Words: executive compensation; pay disparity; top management groups; high-tech firms

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